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The impact of China’s one-child policy on intergenerational and gender relations 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on data from the China Family Panel Studies, this article assesses the state of gender 
equality among Chinese children under the one-child policy. We demonstrate the importance 
of conducting intra-gender and inter-gender comparisons taking into account the perspectives 
of parents and children and the intergenerational (in)congruence between these two 
perspectives. Our results show that parents invest more financial resource and time in 
educating singleton than non-singleton children, which partially supports the hypothesis of 
intra-gender equality. The findings for children’s subjective perceptions of their own life 
circumstances do not consistently support this hypothesis. Since gender differences in 
intergenerational investment and children’s subjective perceptions varied little by sibship 
structure, the hypothesis of inter-gender equality is not consistently supported. We found a 
stronger negative association between the presence of male and elder siblings and 
intergenerational investment in girls, and a larger male–female gap in intergenerational 
investment in urban than in rural areas. We also report a considerable intergenerational 
incongruence between parents’ and children’s perspectives. Our findings call into question 
the effectiveness of intervening solely in parental behaviour and intergenerational investment 
to enhance children’s outcomes. They underline the importance of considering both intra-
gender and inter-gender inequalities in moving the gender revolution forward.  
 
Keywords 
Comparative dimensions, comparative perspectives, gender equality, intergenerational 
relations, one-child policy, post-reform China.  
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Introduction 
Introduced in 1979, China’s one-child policy was replaced by the universal two-child policy 
in 2016 (Wang, Gu, & Cai, 2016). As the world’s most extensive population control policy, 
the one-child policy has been a major driver of otherwise unlikely demographic shifts in 
aspects such as family downsizing and the rise of patriarchal demographics featuring a highly 
skewed sex ratio (Basten & Jiang, 2014). These shifts led to considerable yet unintended 
changes in intergenerational and gender relations in the Chinese family (Kim & Fong, 2014; 
Tsui & Rich, 2002). A major change, according to many scholars (Fong, 2004; Lee, 2012), 
was the rise of gender equality among singleton girls who enjoyed unprecedented 
intergenerational support and investment ‘because they do not have to compete with brothers’ 
for resources (Fong, 2002: 1098), particularly in urban areas (Xu & Yeung, 2013; Zhai & 
Gao, 2010). 
 
In this article, drawing on data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), we assess the 
state of gender equality among Chinese children under the one-child policy by examining the 
ways in which intergenerational investment and children’s subjective perceptions of their 
own circumstances vary by sibship structure and differ between daughters and sons. In doing 
so, we make two contributions to existing scholarship. First, claims about rising gender 
equality under the one-child policy are founded primarily on evidence that, compared to 
children with siblings, singletons in the one-child generation receive greater financial and 
time investment from their parents and extended family members (Fong, 2002; Liu, 2016; 
Tsui & Rich, 2002). We contend that this intra-gender evidence does not suffice to 
demonstrate the achievement of gender equality between girls and boys. Underlining the 
importance of comparison referents, we argue that substantially different evaluation 
outcomes may arise from inter-gender comparison between girls and boys and intra-gender 
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comparison between singleton girls and boys and their same-sex counterparts with siblings. 
Second, following the tradition of social mobility and stratification research, previous and, 
particularly, quantitative research has focussed on parent-to-child intergenerational transfers 
(Lee, 2012; Xu & Yeung, 2013; Zhai & Gao, 2010). This approach overlooks children’s 
subjective views on their own life circumstances, and the presence or absence of gender 
disparities in such views. Since the gendered pattern of children’s perceptions does not 
necessarily mirror that of parents’ intergenerational investment, we suggest that scholars 
should examine the perspectives of both parents and children, and scrutinise the 
intergenerational (in)congruence between the two perspectives. 
 
The one-child policy and social change in post-reform China 
In 1979, the one-child policy was formally introduced to curb population growth, although 
the state framed it as a public health policy and claimed that ‘family planning benefits the 
health of mothers and children’ (see Supplemental Figure S1). Despite the strict enforcement 
of the policy, particularly at its early stage in the 1980s and early 1990s, exceptions were 
permitted for certain social groups to have a second child, such as ethnic minorities 
(comprising around 8% of the Chinese population in 2010), disabled servicemen, and in some 
rural areas if a couple’s first-born was a girl (Murphy, Tao & Lu, 2011). In the 2000s, some 
provinces began to permit a second child when both parents were singleton children (Murphy 
et al., 2011). Despite its uneven and segmented implementation, the one-child policy has 
played a pivotal role in creating China’s new demographic reality. Under the policy, the one-
child family structure ‒– and particularly the four grandparents, two parents and one child (4–
2–1) structure — became prevalent (Wang & Fong, 2009). Nevertheless, the persistence of 
patrilineal son preference encouraged some parents to turn to sex-selective abortion and 
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female infanticide to secure male heirs, creating a highly imbalanced sex ratio at birth of an 
estimated 116 males per 100 females in 2010 (Greenhalgh, 2012).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
A vast rural–urban gulf underlies the implementation and consequences of the one-child 
policy (Greenhalgh, 2012; Murphy et al., 2011), as depicted in Figure 1. From its inception, 
the policy was more rigorously implemented in urban than in rural areas across most Chinese 
provinces. In 1978–1979, China initiated its market reforms and the open-door policy, which 
were followed by the state-guided programmes of societal modernisation, privatisation, and 
urbanisation (Chan, 2015). Due to uneven socioeconomic and cultural development and the 
rapid rise of urban centres, urban China today remains socioeconomically better off than rural 
areas, and patrilineal son preference is de-traditionalised to a greater degree in urban than in 
rural areas (Hu & Scott, 2016). Rural–urban disparities have been exacerbated by the hukou 
system, which distinguishes between rural and urban household registration and thereby 
confers differentiated access to socioeconomic and welfare resources such as medical, 
education and unemployment subsidies in rural or urban places of registration (Chan, 2015).  
 
The one-child policy and intergenerational gender equality 
Despite its creation of the patriarchal demographic pattern, paradoxically, the one-child 
policy may have helped foster greater gender equality among Chinese children. Such gender 
equality may be noted in the intergenerational transfer of resources. The prevalence of the 4–
2–1 family structure and China’s rapid socioeconomic development may have enabled and 
encouraged Chinese families to concentrate the investment of available financial and non-
pecuniary resources, such as time and attention, on singleton children (Fong, 2002). Given 
the scarcity of state welfare for elderly people in many parts of China, parental investment in 
children is fuelled in part by the expectation of reciprocal provision of old-age care from 
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children (Hu, 2017). Although patriarchal traditions oblige male more than female children to 
observe filial obligations (Hu & Scott, 2016), singleton sons and daughters — as the only 
children in their respective families — may equally be required to ensure their parents’ old-
age security (Hu, 2017). 
 
A shift has also occurred in the social, cultural and political context of gender equality in 
recent decades. Patrilineal son preference has received less support from members of the 
post-reform generation than from their predecessors (Hu & Scott, 2016). The highly skewed 
sex ratio may have unintendedly elevated the status of young women as ‘rare’ resources in 
social arenas such as the marriage market (Greenhalgh, 2012). Under the one-child policy, 
the presence or absence of siblings and specific sibship structures are imbued with cultural 
and symbolic meaning. Patrilineal son preference may have encouraged parents to have 
multiple children to secure a male heir, despite hefty fines for breaking the law (Murphy et al., 
2011). Although ethnic minorities and many rural families were allowed to have a second 
child, the segmented implementation of the ‘second-child policy’ was inherently selective, 
with the aim of accommodating the stubborn persistence of patrilineal values in these social 
groups (Murphy et al., 2011). By contrast, however, parents’ conscious preference to have 
only one child, and particularly one daughter, may in part reflect their self-selective departure 
from patrilineal values (Hu, 2017). In recent years, progress toward gender equality may also 
have been propelled by state and activist campaigns such as the Care for Girl and MeToo 
movements. 
 
Comparing perspectives: Parents vs children  
Against the backdrop of societal individualisation in post-reform China (Yan, 2009), we 
should not overlook potential gender (in)equality in children’s subjective views on their own 
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life circumstances. The market transition and dissolution of work units unmoored the one-
child generation from collectivist and patriarchal traditions (Yan, 2009), fostering a sense of 
individual personhood (Fong, 2002). Such individuality is often projected through 
individualised educational and career aspirations (Fong, 2002; Liu, 2016) and the self-
reflexive approach adopted by singleton children to construct a sense of subjective wellbeing 
(Kim & Fong, 2014; Wang & Fong, 2009).  
 
However, children’s subjective perception remains largely absent from the assessment of 
gender equality under the one-child policy. Following the tradition of socioeconomic 
mobility research, previous studies on China have predominantly focussed on the one-way 
traffic of parent-to-child care provision and the transfer of economic and human capital (Lee, 
2012; Liu, 2016; Xu & Yeung, 2013). Irrespective of parental investment, children construct 
independent views on their own lived experiences (Fong, 2002; Hu, 2015), and these views 
may help shape their life aspirations, subjectively perceived sense of gender (in)equality, and 
subjective wellbeing. In this article, we contend that how children make sense of, and act 
upon, their own lives is at least as important as the amount of intergenerational investment 
they receive. 
 
Distinguishing between parents’ and children’s perspectives also enables us to explore 
potential intergenerational (in)congruence. If familial resources are concentrated on singleton 
children (compared to children with siblings), and intergenerational investment in singleton 
girls and boys tends to be equal (Fong, 2002; Kim & Fong, 2014), it is important to 
determine whether these patterns in investment are mirrored by, and thus explain, disparities 
within children’s own perceptions. Examining this intergenerational (in)congruence may 
reveal whether gendered intergenerational investment translates into the gendered ways in 
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which children make sense of their lives. Intergenerational (in)congruence also has direct 
policy relevance, shedding light on the potential effectiveness of intervening solely in adult 
family members’ behaviour in an attempt to enhance children’s outcomes.  
 
Intra-gender vs inter-gender comparison 
It is widely acknowledged that gender equality is defined through relative social comparisons, 
and such comparisons are conducted in multiple dimensions (Hu & Yucel, 2018). The claim 
that greater gender equality existed among Chinese children under the one-child policy was 
based one-sidedly on intra-gender evidence comparing singleton girls and boys to those with 
siblings (Fong, 2002; Liu, 2016; Xu & Yeung, 2013). Only a small number of studies have 
considered male–female equality, and conducted inter-gender comparison between singleton 
daughters and sons (Lee, 2012). It is necessary to distinguish between intra-gender and inter-
gender comparisons. Conceptually, the two comparative dimensions represent distinct 
pathways in the gender revolution. Whilst the former underlines the need to move the gender 
revolution forward by reducing within-gender disparities, the latter capitalises on the 
achievements of gender egalitarianism by narrowing female–male inequalities (Hu & Yucel, 
2018). Furthermore, the presence of siblings may affect the amount of resources available for 
investment in each child as well as the ways in which resources are (unevenly) distributed 
between siblings (Wang & Fong, 2009). We cannot necessarily infer that the one-child policy 
has fostered gender equality between girls and boys merely from evidence that singleton girls 
in the one-child generation receive more intergenerational investment than their counterparts 
with siblings (Fong, 2002; Wang & Fong, 2009). Methodologically, scholars need to conduct 
both intra-gender and inter-gender comparisons, and triangulate evidence from the two 
comparative dimensions.  
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Hypotheses 
H1 (intra-gender difference): Singleton children enjoy a greater amount of 
intergenerational investment (H1A) and more positive subjective perceptions of their 
life circumstances (H1B) than their counterparts with siblings; and the intra-gender 
difference between singleton and non-singleton children is greater in urban than in 
rural areas (H1C). 
H2 (inter-gender difference): The gender gap in intergenerational investment (H2A) 
and children’s subjective perceptions of their life circumstances (H2B) is smaller 
between singleton girls and boys than that between girls and boys with siblings; and 
the difference in the female–male gap between singleton and non-singleton children is 
greater in rural than in urban areas (H2C). 
H3 (intergenerational congruence): Differentials in intergenerational investment 
mediate and thus explain gender and sibship-structure differences in children’s 
subjective perceptions. 
 
If singleton daughters indeed enjoyed gender equality under the one-child policy, we would 
expect both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, which take account of both parents’ and 
children’s perspectives and distinct comparative dimensions, to hold. Due to the persistence 
of son preference in rural as opposed to urban China (Hu & Scott, 2016), we expect the inter-
gender discrepancy between girls and boys to be greater in rural than in urban areas. As the 
one-child policy was more rigorously implemented and patrilineal ideals are de-
traditionalised to a greater degree in urban than in rural China, the presence of younger (male) 
siblings for urban girls could indicate that the parents may have a particularly strong son 
preference (Murphy et al., 2011). Therefore, we would expect that the intra-gender difference 
between singleton and non-singleton children to be greater in urban than in rural areas. If 
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differentials in intergenerational investment are primarily responsible for disparities in 
children’s subjective perceptions, we would expect Hypothesis 3 to hold.   
 
Data and methods 
We used data from the 2010 CFPS. In the survey, individual face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with both child and adult members of the sampled households, thereby capturing 
the perspectives of both parents and children. Multi-stage probability-proportional-to-size 
sampling was used to construct a nationally representative sample of 16,000 households from 
25 provinces. The response rate at the household level was 81.28%. The self-completion 
module was only completed by children aged 10–15 in 2010 (N = 3,464). To construct our 
analytical sample, we first eliminated children outside this age range and 120 children who 
did not attend school. We then eliminated 144 cases with missing information for key 
variables (4.2% of the original sample), yielding a final analytical sample of 3,200 school 
children, of whom 49% were female and 38% were from urban areas. The mean age of the 
girls was 13.10 and that of the boys was 13.04. The Little’s test was conducted to ensure that 
our list-wise deletion of missing cases was completely at random. Table 1 displays detailed 
sample characteristics.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Dependent variables 
We capture gender equality outcomes using a wide range of indicators, taking account of 
both parents’ and children’s perspectives, and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions 
of intergenerational investment. First, we measured annual family expenditure (in Chinese 
Yuan, including input from both parents and extended family members) on a given child’s 
education, covering both school and extra-curricular activities; the relative percentage of total 
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family expenditure represented by educational expenditure on the child; and the total weekly 
time spent by parents and extended family members on supervising the child’s academic 
work. No statistically significant gender difference was noted at the 10% level for 
intergenerational pecuniary investment. However, a stark rural–urban gap was found in both 
absolute (t = 15.54, p < .001) and relative (t = 6.34, p < .001) educational expenditure and 
parents’ non-pecuniary investment of time in their children (t = 9.47, p < .001). 
 
The CFPS also asked the child respondents the following question: ‘Do you think girls are 
faced with greater pressure than boys in society?’. The survey interviewers were instructed to 
elaborate on the term ‘pressure’ as the ‘stress and challenge perceived by an individual’. 
Although the nature and source of ‘stress’ and ‘challenge’ may differ considerably for girls 
and boys, the measure usefully captures the diffuse sense of gender (in)equality as 
subjectively perceived by children. The responses were recorded on a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
scale, which we reversed so that the baseline category (‘0’) indicated perceived gender 
inequality and ‘1’ indicated perceived gender equality. Around two-thirds of the children 
perceived that, compared to boys, girls are under greater ‘pressure’ in society. A higher 
proportion of boys (70%) than girls (60%, χ2 = 36.01, p < .001) perceived society to be 
gender equal, and the rural–urban gulf was noted only among girls (χ2 = 5.51, p < .05). The 
children’s educational aspirations reflect their subjective projection of individual agency and 
personhood (Fong, 2002). We measured educational aspiration as the number of years of 
schooling that the child respondents aspired to complete. On average, the girls had higher 
educational aspirations than the boys (t = 1.64, p < .10), and the urban children had higher 
educational aspirations than their rural counterparts (t = 7.41, p < .001). Perceived happiness 
is indicative of children’s generalised sense of subjective wellbeing and how they themselves 
fare in life. The CFPS asked the children: ‘In general, how happy are you?’, to which 
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responses were recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘very unhappy’ (1) to ‘very happy’ 
(5). On balance, urban children reported enjoying greater happiness in their lives than their 
rural counterparts (t = 3.87, p < .001). 
 
Sibship structure 
The key independent variables were a series of dummy variables capturing children’s sibship 
structure, i.e. whether the children had one or more elder and younger brothers, elder and 
younger sisters, respectively. As it was rare for more than one person to appear in each 
sibship role, we coded as ‘yes’ (1) cases in which a child had one or more siblings in a given 
sibship position. We experimented with disaggregating each sibling position by more specific 
age groups, such as pre-school and school-age. However, this distinction was not found to 
make a statistically significant difference to the outcome variables, and did not contribute to 
increasing the overall model fit. It was therefore excluded from our final analysis.  
 
The results confirm that the one-child policy has only been loosely implemented, particularly 
in rural areas, as 34% of the girls and 44% of the boys were the only children in their 
respective families. While 57% of the urban children were the only children in their 
respective families, only 28% of the rural children were the only child (χ2 = 3.87, p < .001). 
The results also delineate a nuanced demographic reality under the policy: Whereas the girls 
(38%) were much more likely than the boys (15%) to have younger brothers (χ2 = 202.40, p 
< .001), the boys (24%) were more likely than the girls (17%) to have elder sisters (χ2 = 
23.92, p < .001). Despite the one-child policy, parents upholding patrilineal son preference 
usually attempt a second child to secure a male heir if their first-born is female (Greenhalgh, 
2012).  
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Covariates 
We controlled for children’s age and its quadratic form to account for non-linearity. As well 
as distinguishing between rural and urban (38%) location of residence, we controlled for rural 
vs urban (20.5%) hukou (household registration) status (Chan, 2015). Children’s academic 
performance may influence both their self-perception and the educational investment they 
receive from parents. We measured the children’s academic performance by adding up their 
scores in standardised maths and literacy tests conducted as part of the CFPS. We included a 
dummy variable for boarding school (zhudu) attendance (22.9%), as this may influence the 
time children could spend with their parents and siblings as well as children’s own sense of 
independence. We also controlled for parents’ years of schooling (M = 7.50, SD = 4.19) and 
single-parenthood (5.4%). As parents’ gender roles may influence gendered intergenerational 
relations (Hu, 2015), we distinguished dual-earner families (66.6%) from male-earner 
families. At the family level, we also controlled for annual family income per capita and the 
number of routine residents in the household (M = 4.12, SD = 1.40) (see online supplemental 
material for the covariates tested in our preliminary analysis but excluded from this article).  
  
Analytical strategy 
We used hierarchical regression models with random intercepts at the family level to account 
for the clustering of multiple children within the same family and any unobserved 
heterogeneities at family level. We log-transformed parents’ financial and time investment in 
children’s education and family income per capita, due to their skewed distributions. Linear 
regression models were fitted for all the dependent variables except children’s perceptions of 
society’s gender equality, for which a binomial logistic regression model was fitted. The first 
set of models were fitted separately for girls and boys for intra-gender comparison. The 
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interaction terms between rural vs urban residence and the sibship dummies were then added 
to the models to explore rural–urban differences. The second set of models were fitted using 
the full sample to enable inter-gender comparison between boys and girls across sibship 
structures. Similarly, the rural–urban interaction terms were added to the models. Third, we 
included the intergenerational investment measures in the models predicting children’s 
subjective perceptions to test whether differences in the former mediated the relationships 
between sibship, gender and rural/urban residence, respectively, and children’s subjective 
perceptions. To aid the interpretation of the results and conserve space, we graphed the 
marginal effects for the key variables (see supplemental online material for full results). The 
variance inflation factor (VIF values < 5) test was conducted to ensure that no 
multicollinearity existed between the predictors. Although parents may self-select to have 
more than one child, our additional tests correcting for this selection yielded results that were 
consistent with those reported in this article. This may be because the self-selection is closely 
related to, and thus captured by, observed traits such as rural vs urban hukou and residence 
(for example differentiated endorsement of patrilineal values) and family socioeconomic 
status such as capability to pay fines. 
 
Findings 
In this section, we first present the intra-gender comparative findings, separately for girls and 
boys. We then present the inter-gender comparative findings. Lastly, we report the results for 
the intergenerational (in)congruence between the perspectives of children and parents.  
 
Intra-gender comparison: Girls  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Figure 2 depicts the marginal effects of sibship on intergenerational investment in girls and 
on their subjective perceptions. The results support Hypothesis 1A: Compared to singleton 
girls, those with siblings received less financial investment in their education. Specifically, 
financial investment in girls’ education was negatively associated with the presence of 
younger brothers, elder brothers and elder sisters, respectively, but not that of younger sisters. 
These negative associations were found to be similar in both the absolute amount of 
investment and the relative proportion of the family’s total expenditure represented by such 
investment. The proportion of family expenditure spent on girls’ education was negatively 
associated with the presence of younger sisters. These findings are consistent with China’s 
traditional patriarchal hierarchy, which gives precedence to male and elder siblings: the 
distribution of resources trickles down the gender-cum-age lineage (Hu & Scott, 2016). 
Moreover, a low level of correlation was found between financial and non-pecuniary 
investment in girls (Pearson’s r = .09, p < .10), and sibship seemed to have varying effects on 
intergenerational time and financial investment in girls’ education. Parents spent less time 
supervising their daughters academically in the presence of male but not female siblings.  
 
The results do not consistently support Hypothesis 1B, as the girls’ subjective perceptions 
and aspirations varied little by sibship structure. Only a few exceptions were noted. 
Compared to singleton girls, those with elder brothers (OR = 0.93, p < .10) had marginally 
lower odds of reporting the perception that, compared with boys, girls are faced with greater 
‘pressure’ in society. This may be attributed to the patriarchal ideals that oblige the eldest 
male sibling (eventually) to shoulder the responsibility of heading up the family (Hu & Scott, 
2016). Rural girls with younger sisters had lower educational aspirations than their singleton 
counterparts (B = –0.67, p < .05). Rural girls with elder brothers (B = –0.26, p < .10) and 
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particularly younger brothers (B = –0.16, p < .01) reported feeling less happy with life than 
their singleton counterparts.  
 
Supporting Hypothesis 1C, the negative associations between the presence of siblings and 
intergenerational investment of both financial resources and time in girls were stronger in 
urban than in rural areas. In part, this may be because of the higher cost associated with 
raising a child and tighter time constraints faced by parents in urban as opposed to rural areas. 
 
Intra-gender comparison: Boys  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 3 depicts the results for boys’ intra-gender comparisons. Hypothesis 1A is supported 
by the results: The presence of siblings consistently predicted a smaller proportion of 
intergenerational investment in boys’ education relative to total family expenditure. In terms 
of boys’ subjective perceptions, the results do not consistently support Hypothesis 1B. The 
presence of elder sisters positively predicts the perception of urban boys that girls and boys 
are faced with similar levels of ‘pressure’ in society (OR = 1.12, p < .05). In urban areas, 
elder sisters may serve as role models for their younger brothers, sending positive signals 
regarding gender equality (Lu & Trieman, 2008). Urban boys with elder brothers (B = –1.37, 
p < .01) and younger brothers (B = –1.30, p < .05), respectively, reported lower educational 
aspirations than their singleton counterparts. Patriarchal traditions oblige Chinese men to 
honour their families by achieving educational and professional success (Hu & Scott, 2016). 
Compared to boys with siblings, singleton boys — as their families’ ‘only hope’ — may feel 
under particular pressure to record high achievements (Fong, 2004). Boys with siblings were 
found to be generally less happy in life than their singleton counterparts, although this 
difference was not statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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No consistent empirical support was found for Hypothesis 1C. Compared to singleton boys, 
boys with elder brothers in rural areas (B = –0.25, p < .10), younger brothers in rural areas (B 
= –0.34, p < .01) and elder sisters in urban areas (B = –0.79, p < .001) received less financial 
investment in their education. No consistent rural–urban differences were observed in the 
associations between sibship structure and intergenerational investment in boys and in boys’ 
subjective perceptions. 
 
Inter-gender comparison: Girls and boys 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Figure 4 depicts the marginal differences between girls and boys in intergenerational 
investment and in children’s subjective perceptions across sibship structures. The findings do 
not support Hypothesis 2A, which predicts that singleton boys and girls enjoy greater inter-
gender equality in intergenerational investment than their counterparts with siblings (see Liu, 
2016; Tsui & Rich, 2002). We found little gender difference (at the 5% level) in 
intergenerational investment, irrespective of sibship structure. The only exception was that 
urban parents invested more in the education of boys with elder brothers than girls with elder 
brothers, in terms of both financial resources (Bmale-female = 0.77, p < .05) and time (Bmale-female 
= 0.34, p < .05).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
The gender gap in the likelihood of children perceiving that girls and boys are faced with 
similar levels of ‘pressure’ in society varied little with sibship structure. Thus, the results do 
not appear to support Hypothesis 2B that, from children’s perspectives, greater gender 
equality exists among singleton than non-singleton children. However, consistent with 
Hypothesis 2C, a considerable rural–urban difference was noted. Compared to their urban 
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counterparts, rural girls and boys were more likely to differ in their views on the presence (or 
absence) of differentiated levels of societal ‘pressure’ on girls and boys.  
 
No statistically significant gender difference was found in educational aspiration among 
singleton children. In families with siblings, however, girls had higher educational aspirations 
than boys, particularly in urban areas. This finding may have two concurrent explanations. 
First, boys with siblings may be less likely to perceive themselves as their families’ ‘only 
hope’, reducing their aspirations relative to those of singleton boys (Fong, 2004). Second, 
girls with siblings may attach particular value to education as a means of changing their 
gendered fate (Lee, 2012), resulting in high aspirations.  
 
On balance, the girls reported having enjoyed greater happiness in life than the boys. The 
gender gap was particularly prominent among singleton children in rural areas (Bmale-female = –
0.28, p < .01). This may be because, compared to rural girls with siblings, singleton girls in 
rural areas are less likely to live in families that closely endorse patrilineal ideals. In urban 
areas, the gender gap in children’s perceived happiness in life was prominent among children 
with younger brothers (Bmale-female = –0.27, p < .05) and elder sisters (Bmale-female = –0.33, p 
< .05), respectively. These results may be related to the divergent ways in which urban girls 
and boys are influenced by the presence of younger brothers and elder sisters. Whereas urban 
boys’ perceived happiness in life was negatively associated with the presence of younger 
brothers and elder sisters (see Figure 3), urban girls with younger brothers and particularly 
elder sisters enjoyed greater happiness in life than their singleton counterparts (see Figure 2). 
These results may partly reflect the de-traditionalisation of patrilineal values in urban China 
(Hu & Scott, 2016). As a result, it is unlikely that the presence of younger brothers 
‘downgrades’ the status of urban girls and thus negatively affects their subjective wellbeing, 
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as it may do in rural areas. By contrast, the presence of elder sisters may act as a positive role 
model that helps to enhance girls’, but not boys’, subjective wellbeing in urban areas (Lu & 
Trieman, 2008).     
 
Comparative perspectives and intergenerational incongruence 
In Figures 2, 3 and 4, the grey dashed lines represent the marginal effects of the models, 
including intergenerational financial and time investment, in predicting children’s subjective 
perceptions. Our findings did not support Hypothesis 3 that differentials in intergenerational 
investment mediate and therefore explain disparities in children’s subjective perceptions. The 
inclusion of intergenerational investment measures made almost no difference to the marginal 
effects of sibship, gender and rural–urban residence on children’s subjective perceptions. 
This intergenerational incongruence may in part be due to the (re)production of cross-
generational gender inequalities through channels other than the intergenerational pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary investment investigated in this research, such as the gendered 
performance of domesticity (Hu, 2015), marital orientation and mobility (Hu, 2016), and 
gendered work and occupational orientations (Bian, 2002).  
 
Conclusions 
In this article we addressed three intersecting social currents under China’s one-child policy: 
family and sibship structures (Greenhalgh, 2012; Wang et al., 2016); intergenerational 
relations between parents and children (Fong, 2004; Kim & Fong, 2014); and gender 
(in)equality (Hu, 2015; Wang & Fong, 2009). We drew on nationally representative data to 
assess the prevalent conjecture that China’s one-child policy may have helped to create 
greater gender equality among singleton children (Fong, 2002; Liu, 2016; Wang & Fong, 
2009). 
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First, our findings show that substantially different evaluative outcomes may arise from intra-
gender and inter-gender comparison. Singleton children received more financial investment 
in their education than their non-singleton counterparts; and parents spent less time 
supervising girls’ academic work in the presence of male siblings. These findings may appear 
to support the argument that, under the one-child policy, Chinese families were able to 
concentrate their resources on their singleton children (Wang & Fong, 2009). Nevertheless, 
the results from inter-gender comparisons revealed little discrepancy in intergenerational 
investment of money and time in the education of boys and girls, irrespective of sibship 
structure. Arguably, the resource concentration on singleton children — girls and boys alike 
— may simply be an artefact of the financial strain faced by families with multiple children 
(as opposed to one-child families), which may affect the available resources parents can 
invest in a given child rather than the ways in which resources are distributed. The discrepant 
findings of the intra-gender and inter-gender comparisons challenge the assumption that the 
intra-gender advantages enjoyed by singleton daughters over their non-singleton counterparts 
(Fong, 2002; Liu, 2016) can readily add up to female–male gender equality. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to consider both intra-gender and inter-gender disparities in moving the gender 
revolution forward (Hu & Yucel, 2018). 
 
Second, the perspective of the comparison matters. We caution against a one-sided focus on 
parents (Lee, 2012; Xu & Yeung, 2013) and the neglect of children’s perspectives in research 
on the legacy of the one-child policy. It is clear from our findings that little intergenerational 
association exists between patterns of intergenerational investment and those of children’s 
subjective perceptions of their life circumstances in both the intra-gender and inter-gender 
dimensions. Children’s subjective perceptions matter not only in their own right. Our 
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findings also suggest that differentials in parental behaviour across sibship conditions cannot 
be assumed to explain how children make sense of their own lives. The results therefore 
problematise the assumption undergirding mainstream policy interventions in China that 
gender equality among children can be achieved solely by changing the ways in which 
parents behave and by equalising intergenerational investment (Zhai & Gao, 2010). 
 
Third, our findings problematise the assumption that greater gender equality may exist among 
urban as opposed to rural children under the one-child policy (Fong, 2002; Fong, 2004). The 
results for rural–urban disparity differed considerably between parents’ and children’s 
perspectives. Consistent with the observation that urbanites adhere less closely to patriarchal 
values than rural Chinese (Hu & Scott, 2016), we found that rural boys and girls differed 
more than their urban counterparts in their perceived sense of societal ‘pressure’ on them. In 
contrast, however, the negative association between the presence of male and elder siblings 
and intergenerational investment in girls’ education was stronger in urban than in rural areas. 
This observation may be attributed to an endogenous selection effect: given the strict 
implementation of the one-child policy and hefty extra-child fines in urban China (Murphy et 
al., 2012), urbanites who chose to break the policy may have a particularly strong preference 
for sons, although the overall level of adherence to patrilineality remains stronger in rural 
than in urban areas (Hu & Scott, 2016). 
 
The limitations of our study indicate several promising directions for further research. First, 
intergenerational relations and the progress toward gender equality are dynamic, and are 
closely embedded in their socio-historical contexts. Yet our analysis provided only a static 
snapshot of the dynamic processes. Ideally, future efforts should be made to collect 
longitudinal and time-series data and conduct in situ qualitative fieldwork to capture the 
 Author accepted manuscript | Contemporary Social Science 
23 
temporal dynamics of intergenerational and gender relations under the one-child policy and 
the new universal two-child policy. Second, our analysis focused specifically on the 
intergenerational relations between parents and adolescent children. However, given the rapid 
pace of population ageing in China, members of the one-child generation may soon take on 
the responsibility of providing socioeconomic support and care for their elderly parents and 
grandparents. As the life course dynamics of the singleton children unfold, future scholars 
could usefully explore how the one-child family structure may influence the potentially 
gendered provision of old-age care in a multigenerational framework.  
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
   Girls  Boys  Gender difference 
Variable Min Max All  Rural  Urban  
Rural vs 
urban  All  Rural  Urban  
Rural vs 
urban  All Rural Urban 
Sibship                
Only child  0 1 .34 .22 .55 ***  .44 .35 .60 ***  *** *** + 
Elder brother  0 1 .13 .15 .08 ***  .13 .14 .11 *  ns ns ns 
Younger brother 0 1 .38 .45 .25 ***  .15 .18 .11 ***  *** *** *** 
Elder sister  0 1 .17 .20 .10 ***  .24 .26 .17 ***  *** *** ** 
Younger sister 0 1 .19 .22 .12 ***  .15 .19 .09 ***  ** + * 
Parents’ perspective                
Annual expenditure on the child’s 
education (¥) a 
0 10,300 1,206 833 1,848 ***  1,231 842 1,834 ***  ns ns ns 
  (1,834) (1,227) (2,432)   (1,842) (1,239) (2,384)      
% total family expenditure on the child’s 
education a 
0 .34 .04 .04 .05 ***  .05 .04 .06 ***  ns ns ns 
  (.06) (.06) (.07)   (.07) (.06) (.07)      
Weekly time supervising the child 
academically (hour) 
0 17 1.79 1.48 2.32 ***  2.08 1.48 3.00 ***  *** ns ** 
  (3.36) (3.13) (3.65)   (3.65) (2.94) (4.39)      
Children’s perspective                
Perceiving society as gender equal  0 1 .60 .58 .64 *  .70 .70 .71 ns  *** *** * 
Educational aspiration (year) a 0 21 14.52 14.06 15.32 ***  14.30 13.97 14.80 ***  * ns * 
  (3.81) (3.88) (3.54)   (3.93) (3.89) (3.95)      
Perceived happiness in life 1 5 4.24 4.19 4.33 *  4.11 4.07 4.18 *  *** * ** 
   (.86) (.89) (.82)   (.88) (.88) (.89)      
Covariates                
Age 10 15 13.10 13.12 13.06 ns  13.04 13.07 12.98 ns  ns ns ns 
   (1.74) (1.76) (1.77)   (1.72) (1.74) (1.68)      
Urban hukou (ref = non-urban) 0 1 .20 .03 .50 ***  .21 .02 .50 ***  ns + ns 
Academic performance 0 58 33.52 32.21 35.77 ***  32.17 30.63 34.56 ***  *** ** * 
   (10.56) (10.72) (9.89)   (10.59) (11.02) (9.38)      
Boarding school (ref = no) 0 1 .23 .29 .13 ***  .22 .30 .10 ***  ns ns + 
Parents' education (year) 0 22 7.54 6.39 9.53 ***  7.46 6.27 9.31 ***  ns ns ns 
   (4.19) (3.83) (4.06)   (4.18) (3.81) (4.05)      
Single-parent family (ref = two-parent) 0 1 .05 .04 .05 ns  .05 .05 .08 +  + ns + 
Dual-earner family (ref = male-earner) 0 1 .67 .74 .55 ***  .66 .76 .51 ***  ns ns ns 
Annual family income per capita a 5 44,000 6,472 4,708 9,503 ***  7,164 5,545 9,677 ***  ** *** ns 
  (6,812) (4,606) (8,674)   (7,625) (5,828) (9,240)      
Family size 2 14 4.21 4.44 3.81 ***  4.01 4.18 3.74 ***  *** *** ns 
   (1.44) (1.44) (1.34)   (1.36) (1.39) (1.26)      
N   1,582 1,000 582   1,618 984 634      
Note: a Top 1% replaced to be equal to the 99th percentile to minimise the influence of outlier cases. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Mean score for continuous 
variables, and percentage for categorical variables. Dummy variables have a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. Two-tailed t-test for continuous variables and chi-
square test for categorical variables. ¥1 ≈ £0.1 in 2010.  
ns = not statistically significant at the 10% level, + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 1. Gender ratio at birth in China 1982–2010, by rural–urban context 
 
Source: China Statistics Yearbooks. Last accessed 23 September 2017: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/AnnualData/ 
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Figure 2. Marginal effects of sibship among girls, with 95% confidence intervals, by rural–
urban residence (reference = singleton girls, N =1,582).  
 
Note: OR = Odds Ratio.  
Logistic regression for perceived gender equality.  
All covariates held constant.  
Grey dashed lines indicate results from the models including intergenerational investment.  
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Figure 3. Marginal effects of sibship among boys, with 95% confidence intervals, by rural–
urban residence (reference = singleton boys, N = 1,618).  
 
Note: OR = Odds Ratio.  
Logistic regression for perceived gender equality.  
All covariates held constant.  
Grey dashed lines indicate results from the models including intergenerational investment.  
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Figure 4. Marginal male-female differences, with 95% confidence intervals, by sibship status 
and rural/urban residence (reference = female, N = 3,200).  
 
Note: OR = Odds Ratio.  
Logistic regression for perceived gender equality.  
All covariates held constant.  
Grey dashed lines indicate results from the models including intergenerational investment.  
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Supplemental online material 
for 
The impact of China’s one-child policy on intergenerational and gender relations 
 
In this document, we present further contextual information about the one-child policy and 
full results for the two-level random-intercept regression models. In Figure S1, we present an 
official poster promoting the one-child policy as a public health campaign, instead of a 
population control policy.  
 
In Tables S1 to S6, we present the results for the key predictors predicting each of the six 
dependent variables. Because the results for the covariates changed little within each set of 
models, in Table S7 we present the results for the covariates from the models (marked by a 
red asterisk ‘*’ in Tables S1 to S6) based on the full sample. In our preliminary analysis, we 
also experimented with including parents’ occupation, Communist Party affiliation, the 
presence of grandparents at home and elder siblings’ participation in paid work. However, 
these variables were not included in the final analysis, as they did not show a statistically 
significant association with the dependent variables measuring the gender empowerment 
outcomes, and their inclusion neither increased the overall model fit nor affected the results 
for the other variables. This may be because the effects of these variables have already been 
captured by variables such as parents’ education, the family’s socio-economic status and size. 
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Figure S1. ‘Family planning benefits the health of mothers and children’. Poster created and 
produced by the Family Planning Office of Kunming, circa 1978.  
 
Source: National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health, USA.  
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/chinesefamilyplanning/culturalrevolutionpg4.html. Last accessed: February 
14, 2018.   
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Table S1. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept models predicting 
annual expenditure on the child’s education (log) 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
*All: 
Gender 
*only-child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother –0.42** –0.23+ –0.18 –0.25+   –0.37** –0.21 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)   (0.13) (0.15) 
Elder sister –0.27* –0.31** –0.10 –0.13   –0.19+ –0.04 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)   (0.10) (0.12) 
Younger brother –0.32** –0.26* –0.31* –0.34**   –0.27** –0.26* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)   (0.10) (0.12) 
Younger sister –0.13 –0.17 –0.05 –0.10   –0.04 –0.00 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)   (0.10) (0.12) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) 0.18 0.43*** 0.44** 0.59*** 0.36*** 0.28* 0.37*** 0.53*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.14) 
Urban * elder brother   –0.96** 0.08    –0.67* 
   (0.31) (0.23)    (0.28) 
Urban * elder sister   –0.77** –0.65**    –0.63** 
   (0.26) (0.23)    (0.24) 
Urban * younger brother   0.02 0.30    –0.01 
   (0.21) (0.22)    (0.20) 
Urban * younger sister   –0.32 –0.33    –0.17 
   (0.24) (0.29)    (0.22) 
Male (ref = female)     0.06 0.08 0.02 0.04 
     (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) 
Only child (ref = no)     0.45*** 0.42**   
     (0.10) (0.13)   
Male * only child     –0.17 –0.29+   
     (0.11) (0.16)   
Urban * male      –0.04  –0.05 
      (0.14)  (0.17) 
Urban * only child      0.12   
      (0.19)   
Urban * male * only child      0.23   
      (0.24)   
Male * elder brother       0.14 –0.06 
       (0.16) (0.19) 
Male * elder sister       –0.15 –0.17 
       (0.13) (0.16) 
Male * younger brother       0.05 –0.03 
       (0.14) (0.17) 
Male * younger sister       –0.14 –0.10 
       (0.14) (0.17) 
Urban * male * elder brother        0.83* 
        (0.37) 
Urban * male * elder sister        0.21 
        (0.30) 
Urban * male * younger brother        0.22 
        (0.30) 
Urban * male * younger sister        –0.19 
        (0.34) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion 6,184 6,295 6,196 6,313 12,242 12,262 12,291 12,346 
Log-likelihood –3,026 –3,081 –3,017 –3,075 –6,052 –6,050 –6,053 –6,044 
N 1,582 1,618 1,582 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from 
the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S2. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept models predicting 
the percentage of total family expenditure spent on the child’s education (log) 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
*All: 
Gender 
*only-child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship* 
rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother –0.32*** –0.22*** –0.20* –0.19*   –0.26*** –0.18* 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)   (0.06) (0.07) 
Elder sister –0.18*** –0.23*** –0.08 –0.15*   –0.14** –0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.05) 
Younger brother –0.19*** –0.16** –0.15* –0.14*   –0.17*** –0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.06) 
Younger sister –0.13* –0.19** –0.09 –0.17*   –0.09+ –0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)   (0.05) (0.06) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) 0.06 0.10+ 0.24** 0.19* 0.10* –0.00 0.11* 0.24*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
Urban * elder brother   –0.46** –0.06    –0.28* 
   (0.15) (0.13)    (0.14) 
Urban * elder sister   –0.44*** –0.26*    –0.35** 
   (0.12) (0.11)    (0.11) 
Urban * younger brother   –0.12 –0.04    –0.13 
   (0.10) (0.12)    (0.10) 
Urban * younger sister   –0.18 –0.07    –0.10 
   (0.11) (0.14)    (0.10) 
Male (ref = female)     0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Only child (ref = no)     0.27*** 0.17**   
     (0.05) (0.06)   
Male * only child     –0.04 –0.00   
     (0.05) (0.08)   
Urban * male      0.02  –0.07 
      (0.07)  (0.08) 
Urban * only child      0.26**   
      (0.09)   
Urban * male * only child      –0.06   
      (0.11)   
Male * elder brother       0.09 0.02 
       (0.08) (0.09) 
Male * elder sister       –0.07 –0.11 
       (0.06) (0.07) 
Male * younger brother       0.05 0.01 
       (0.06) (0.08) 
Male * younger sister       –0.11 –0.09 
       (0.07) (0.08) 
Urban * male * elder brother        0.27 
        (0.18) 
Urban * male * elder sister        0.19 
        (0.14) 
Urban * male * younger 
brother 
       0.09 
        (0.14) 
Urban * male * younger sister        –0.09 
        (0.16) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion 3,907 4,093 3,915 4,117 7,694 7,707 7,745 7,801 
Log-likelihood –1,887 –1,980 –1,877 –1,977 –3,778 –3,773 –3,780 –3,771 
N 1,582 1,618 1,582 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from 
the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S3. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept models predicting 
weekly time supervising the child’s academic work (log) 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
*All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother –0.15* –0.09 –0.10 –0.14+ 
  
–0.12+ –0.10 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
  
(0.06) (0.07) 
Elder sister 0.02 –0.06 0.03 0.03 
  
0.05 0.03 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
  
(0.05) (0.06) 
Younger brother –0.10* 0.07 –0.06 0.09 
  
–0.05 –0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
  
(0.05) (0.05) 
Younger sister 0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.06 
  
0.05 0.03 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
  
(0.05) (0.06) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) 0.06 0.03 0.13+ 0.06 0.05 –0.01 0.06 0.04 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) 
Urban * elder brother 
  
–0.19 0.20 
   
–0.13 
   
(0.14) (0.13) 
   
(0.14) 
Urban * elder sister 
  
–0.00 –0.29** 
   
0.03 
   
(0.12) (0.11) 
   
(0.12) 
Urban * younger brother 
  
–0.14 –0.05 
   
–0.07 
   
(0.10) (0.12) 
   
(0.09) 
Urban * younger sister 
  
0.04 0.21 
   
0.04 
   
(0.11) (0.13) 
   
(0.11) 
Male (ref = female) 
    
0.06+ 0.05 0.09* 0.04 
     
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Only child (ref = no) 
    
0.08+ 0.10+ 
  
     
(0.05) (0.06) 
  Male * only child 
    
–0.01 –0.10 
  
     
(0.05) (0.08) 
  Urban * male 
     
0.03 
 
0.09 
      
(0.07) 
 
(0.08) 
Urban * only child 
     
0.01 
  
      
(0.09) 
  Urban * male * only child 
     
0.15 
  
      
(0.12) 
  Male * elder brother 
      
0.00 –0.06 
       
(0.08) (0.10) 
Male * elder sister 
      
–0.16* –0.06 
       
(0.07) (0.08) 
Male * younger brother 
      
0.08 0.09 
       
(0.07) (0.08) 
Male * younger sister 
      
–0.10 –0.10 
       
(0.07) (0.08) 
Urban * male * elder brother 
       
0.30+ 
        
(0.18) 
Urban * male * elder sister 
       
–0.31* 
        
(0.15) 
Urban * male * younger brother 
       
0.03 
        
(0.15) 
Urban * male * younger sister 
       
0.11 
        
(0.17) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion 3,735 3,907 3,761 3,923 7,479 7,495 7,515 7,572 
Log-likelihood –1,801 –1,887 –1,799 –1,880 –3,671 –3,667 –3,665 –3,657 
N 1,582 1,618 1,582 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from 
the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table S4. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept logistic regression models predicting the odds of children’s perceiving 
society as gender equal 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys:  
Sibship 
Boys:  
Sibship 
Girls:  
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban  
Girls:  
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban  
*All:  
Gender 
*only-
child 
All:  
Gender 
*only-
child 
All:  
Gender 
*only-
child* 
rural/ 
urban 
All:  
Gender 
*only-
child* 
rural/ 
urban 
All:  
Gender 
*sibship 
All:  
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother –0.47+ –0.48+ –0.45 –0.44 –0.54+ –0.53+ –0.57 –0.58 
    
–0.47* –0.47* –0.52* –0.51* 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.36) (0.36) 
    
(0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) 
Elder sister 0.02 0.02 0.51+ 0.51* –0.14 –0.13 0.29 0.31 
    
–0.05 –0.03 –0.15 –0.15 
 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) 
    
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) 
Younger brother –0.16 –0.17 –0.01 0.01 –0.27 –0.28 –0.05 –0.03 
    
–0.21 –0.22 –0.28 –0.29 
 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.28) (0.28) (0.22) (0.22) (0.34) (0.33) 
    
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) 
Younger sister 0.02 0.03 –0.34 –0.31 –0.09 –0.08 –0.42 –0.40 
    
–0.07 –0.06 –0.16 –0.14 
 
(0.21) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.34) (0.33) 
    
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.21) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) 0.01 0.03 –0.05 –0.04 –0.30 –0.28 –0.30 –0.29 –0.01 0.00 0.20 0.22 –0.01 0.01 –0.15 –0.14 
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.23) 
Urban * elder brother 
    
0.21 0.17 0.32 0.37 
      
0.20 0.18 
     
(0.55) (0.56) (0.60) (0.60) 
      
(0.47) (0.48) 
Urban * elder sister 
    
0.62 0.61 0.70 0.66 
      
0.50 0.51 
     
(0.49) (0.50) (0.53) (0.53) 
      
(0.43) (0.43) 
Urban * younger brother 
    
0.35 0.38 0.06 0.07 
      
0.27 0.28 
     
(0.37) (0.37) (0.56) (0.56) 
      
(0.32) (0.32) 
Urban * younger sister 
    
0.41 0.40 0.30 0.33 
      
0.36 0.36 
     
(0.45) (0.45) (0.62) (0.62) 
      
(0.39) (0.39) 
Male (ref = female) 
        
0.69*** 0.70*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.38** 0.38** 0.46* 0.46* 
         
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20) 
Only child (ref = no) 
        
0.15 0.15 0.23 0.24 
    
         
(0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) 
    Male * only child 
        
–0.27 –0.28 –0.27 –0.30 
    
         
(0.20) (0.20) (0.27) (0.27) 
    Urban * male 
          
–0.27 –0.27 
  
–0.15 –0.14 
           
(0.27) (0.27) 
  
(0.28) (0.28) 
Urban * only child 
          
–0.28 –0.30 
    
           
(0.31) (0.31) 
    Urban * male * only child 
          
0.13 0.16 
    
           
(0.41) (0.41) 
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Male * elder brother 
            
0.08 0.08 0.02 0.01 
             
(0.29) (0.29) (0.35) (0.35) 
Male * elder sister 
            
0.46+ 0.45+ 0.40 0.40 
             
(0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29) 
Male * younger brother 
            
0.32 0.32 0.35 0.35 
             
(0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.29) 
Male * younger sister 
            
–0.09 –0.09 –0.09 –0.09 
             
(0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) 
Urban * male * elder brother 
              
0.06 0.11 
               
(0.64) (0.65) 
Urban * male * elder sister 
              
0.00 –0.03 
               
(0.57) (0.57) 
Urban * male * younger brother 
              
–0.25 –0.23 
               
(0.52) (0.52) 
Urban * male * younger sister 
              
–0.12 –0.12 
               
(0.59) (0.59) 
Covariate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parental investment No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion 2,209 2,228 2,057 2,076 2,236 2,254 2,084 2,104 4,173 4,192 4,195 4,214 4,206 4,226 4,273 4,293 
Log-likelihood –1,042 –1,040 –966 –964 –1,040 –1,039 –965 –963 –2,022 –2,019 –2,021 –2,018 –2,014 –2,012 –2,011 –2,009 
N 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S5. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept models predicting children’s educational aspirations 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
*All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother 0.45 0.48 –0.29 –0.21 0.57 0.56 0.27 0.34     0.28 0.35 0.41 0.44 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)     (0.30) (0.30) (0.35) (0.35) 
Elder sister 0.15 0.16 –0.11 –0.04 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.19     0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29) (0.29)     (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29) 
Younger brother –0.24 –0.21 –0.76** –0.75** –0.22 –0.19 –0.56+ –0.57+     –0.37+ –0.33 –0.30 –0.27 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.33) (0.33)     (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) (0.25) 
Younger sister –0.47+ –0.47+ –0.38 –0.33 –0.67* –0.68* –0.16 –0.11     –0.53* –0.52* –0.65* –0.65* 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32)     (0.25) (0.25) (0.29) (0.29) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) –0.01 –0.03 –0.37 –0.39 –0.06 –0.11 0.17 0.13 –0.14 –0.17 0.16 0.15 –0.14 –0.18 0.06 –0.00 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.34) (0.34) (0.32) (0.32) (0.17) (0.18) (0.27) (0.27) (0.17) (0.17) (0.31) (0.31) 
Urban * elder brother     –0.47 –0.35 –1.64** –1.67**       –0.32 –0.21 
     (0.67) (0.67) (0.60) (0.60)       (0.66) (0.66) 
Urban * elder sister     0.14 0.20 –0.73 –0.61       –0.04 0.03 
     (0.58) (0.58) (0.49) (0.49)       (0.58) (0.58) 
Urban * younger brother     –0.10 –0.12 –0.47 –0.42       –0.11 –0.09 
     (0.44) (0.44) (0.56) (0.56)       (0.44) (0.44) 
Urban * younger sister     0.76 0.79 –0.76 –0.81       0.57 0.59 
     (0.53) (0.53) (0.62) (0.62)       (0.53) (0.53) 
Male (ref = female)         –0.24 –0.26 0.04 0.03 –0.17 –0.19 –0.21 –0.23 
         (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.27) (0.27) 
Only child (ref = no)         0.09 0.02 0.09 0.04     
         (0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.29)     
Male * only child         0.22 0.24 –0.19 –0.16     
         (0.26) (0.26) (0.36) (0.36)     
Urban * male           –1.05** –1.06**   0.13 0.12 
           (0.36) (0.36)   (0.38) (0.38) 
Urban * only child           –0.15 –0.18     
           (0.42) (0.42)     
Urban * male * only child           1.31* 1.28*     
           (0.55) (0.55)     
Male * elder brother             –0.41 –0.43 0.01 0.03 
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             (0.40) (0.40) (0.48) (0.48) 
Male * elder sister             –0.10 –0.06 0.10 0.13 
             (0.33) (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) 
Male * younger brother             –0.25 –0.26 –0.12 –0.13 
             (0.32) (0.32) (0.39) (0.39) 
Male * younger sister             0.29 0.31 0.58 0.60 
             (0.34) (0.34) (0.40) (0.40) 
Urban * male * elder brother               –1.33 –1.48+ 
               (0.88) (0.88) 
Urban * male * elder sister               –0.68 –0.65 
               (0.74) (0.74) 
Urban * male * younger 
brother 
              –0.46 –0.48 
               (0.70) (0.70) 
Urban * male * younger sister               –1.29 –1.32+ 
               (0.80) (0.80) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parental investment No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion –4,244 –4,240 –4,393 –4,388 –4,243 –4,239 –4,388 –4,383 –8,639 –8,634 –8,633 –8,628 –8,631 –8,626 –8,624 –8,619 
Log-likelihood 8,621 8,635 8,919 8,931 8,648 8,662 8,938 8,950 17,414 17,429 17,427 17,442 17,448 17,462 17,506 17,520 
N 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table S6. Results for the key variables from two-level random-intercept models predicting children’s perceived happiness in life 
 Girls: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Boys: 
Sibship 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Girls: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Boys: 
Sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
*All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*only-
child 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
All: 
Gender 
*sibship 
*rural/ 
urban 
Predictor B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Elder brother –0.17* –0.17* –0.10 –0.09 –0.15+ –0.15+ –0.11 –0.10     –0.17* –0.17* –0.16+ –0.15+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)     (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Elder sister 0.05 0.04 –0.02 –0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03     0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)     (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Younger brother –0.11* –0.11* –0.11 –0.11+ –0.16** –0.16** –0.08 –0.08     –0.13* –0.12* –0.19** –0.19** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)     (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Younger sister –0.08 –0.09 –0.09 –0.08 –0.06 –0.06 –0.05 –0.04     –0.11+ –0.11* –0.10 –0.10 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)     (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Urban residence (ref = rural) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 –0.02 –0.02 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 –0.04 –0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
Urban * elder brother     –0.12 –0.12 0.04 0.04       –0.10 –0.11 
     (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)       (0.16) (0.16) 
Urban * elder sister     0.08 0.06 –0.16 –0.15       0.09 0.08 
     (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)       (0.14) (0.14) 
Urban * younger brother     0.19+ 0.20+ –0.09 –0.08       0.19+ 0.19+ 
     (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13)       (0.10) (0.10) 
Urban * younger sister     –0.11 –0.12 –0.15 –0.17       –0.09 –0.10 
     (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)       (0.13) (0.13) 
Male (ref = female)         –0.09* –0.09* –0.06 –0.06 –0.17*** –0.17*** –0.24*** –0.24*** 
         (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Only child (ref = no)         0.12* 0.11* 0.17* 0.16*     
         (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)     
Male * only child         –0.10 –0.10 –0.22* –0.22*     
         (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)     
Urban * male           –0.09 –0.09   0.14 0.13 
           (0.09) (0.09)   (0.09) (0.09) 
Urban * only child           –0.10 –0.10     
           (0.10) (0.10)     
Urban * male * only child           0.26* 0.26*     
           (0.13) (0.13)     
Male * elder brother             0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
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             (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) 
Male * elder sister             –0.04 –0.03 0.05 0.05 
             (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Male * younger brother             0.04 0.03 0.14 0.13 
             (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
Male * younger sister             0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 
             (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
Urban * male * elder brother               0.13 0.12 
               (0.21) (0.21) 
Urban * male * elder sister               –0.27 –0.24 
               (0.18) (0.18) 
Urban * male * younger 
brother 
              –0.29+ –0.29+ 
               (0.16) (0.16) 
Urban * male * younger sister               –0.04 –0.05 
               (0.19) (0.19) 
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parental investment No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bayesian-information-criterion 4,034 4,048 4,230 4,244 4,058 4,071 4,256 4,271 8,148 8,157 8,167 8,176 8,186 8,195 8,250 8,259 
Log-likelihood –1,951 –1,947 –2,048 –2,045 –1,948 –1,944 –2,047 –2,043 –4,005 –3,998 –4,003 –3,995 –4,000 –3,993 –3,996 –3,988 
N 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 1,582 1,582 1,618 1,618 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 
Note: See Table S7 for results for the covariates. Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table S7. Results for the covariates from two-level random-intercept models (N = 3,200 for 
all models) 
 
Annual 
expenditure 
on the child’s 
education 
(log) 
% of total 
family 
expenditure 
on the child’s 
education 
Weekly time 
supervising 
the child 
academically 
(log) 
Children’s 
perceiving 
society as 
gender equal 
Children’s 
educational 
aspirations 
Children’s 
perceived 
happiness in 
life 
Covariate B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) B(SE) 
Age –0.69** –0.28* –0.52*** –0.47 –0.48 –0.19 
 
(0.26) (0.12) (0.13) (0.47) (0.62) (0.15) 
Age2 0.03** 0.01* 0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Urban hukou (ref = rural) 0.48*** 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.40* 0.81*** –0.03 
 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.22) (0.05) 
Academic performance 0.02*** 0.01*** –0.01*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Boarding school (ref = no) 0.71*** 0.46*** –0.12*** 0.04 0.25 0.03 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.17) (0.04) 
Parents’ schooling years 0.03*** 0.00 0.04*** –0.01 0.10*** 0.01* 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
Single-parent family (ref = no) –0.23+ 0.02 –0.14* 0.02 –0.10 –0.21** 
 
(0.14) (0.07) (0.06) (0.22) (0.30) (0.07) 
Dual-earner family (ref = male-earner) –0.08 –0.03 0.06+ 0.11 0.19 0.05 
 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.15) (0.03) 
Family income per capita (log) 0.32*** –0.03+ 0.04* –0.02 0.28*** 0.05** 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) 
Family size –0.01 –0.05*** 0.04** –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) 
Note: Because the results for the covariates predicting each dependent variable changed little across the models with 
different specifications of the key predictors, we report the results for the covariates based on the full samples (models 
marked by a red asterisk ‘*’). The results continue from the first models for the full sample in Tables S1–S6. 
Individual-level intercept and family-level random intercepts omitted from the table.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
